A Contextual Approach to an Understanding of Competition: A Response to Keating\u27s Philosophy of Athletics by Sadler, William A., Jr.
Philosophic Exchange
Volume 4
Number 1 Volume 4 (1973) Article 14
1973
A Contextual Approach to an Understanding of
Competition: A Response to Keating's Philosophy
of Athletics
William A. Sadler Jr.
Bloomfield College
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons
@Brockport. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophic Exchange by
an authorized editor of Digital Commons @Brockport. For more
information, please contact kmyers@brockport.edu.
Repository Citation
Sadler, William A. Jr. (1973) "A Contextual Approach to an Understanding of Competition: A Response to Keating's Philosophy of
Athletics," Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 4 : No. 1 , Article 14.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol4/iss1/14
WILLIAM SADLER 
Professor of Sociology 
Bloomfield College (N.J.) 
1
Sadler: A Contextual Approach to an Understanding of Competition
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1973
A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF COMPETITION: 
A RESPONSE TO KEATING'$ PHILOSOPHY OF ATHLETICS* 
by 
William A. Sadler, Jr. 
In Profes.5or Keating's philosophy of competition and athletics I find a triple 
objective. First he sets out to provide a definition of competition which will 
enable him to distinguish athletics from activities which may be associated with 
them, such as sports and criminal activities. Secondly, on the basis <>f this 
defmition, .he attempts to canstruct a standa�d by which to mitigate the poten· 
tial excess of competition in athletics. Thir.dly, in a truly competitive spirit, he 
presents an argument so inhere.ntly provocative that response to it is demanded. 
I shall acknowledge the achievement of the third objective by calling the first 
two into question. 
There are various levels at which people will want to criticize his argument. 
·Many who spend a considerable part of their lives within the world of sports 
will argue against his notions on the basis of their own experience. Others will 
attack his argument on moral grounds; his ethics of competition will disturb 
the moral sensitivity of many people who are �ot willing to sacrifice so many 
primary values for the continuance of his kind of athletics. Philosophers will 
undoubtedly take him to task for the confusions and dogmatisms that issue 
from his merging of prescription with description in his definition. While sharing 
in the intentions of such criticisms, my own approach will operate on a different 
level. Nevertheless, I should confess at the outset that underlying the following 
relatively impartial contextual amtlysis, there are a number of beliefs which 
might give my response a bias. It will clear the air, and hopefully the argument, 
if I indicate one of my beliefs about competition. 
I believe, though with some reservations, that commitment to a competitive 
viewpoint as reflected in Keating's philosophy is detrimental to growth towards 
full humanness.1 As it becomes part of one's habitual pattern of perception, 
competitiveness interferes with an individual's way of perceiving others as 
persons. It functions to obstruct a normal process of critical self-reflection and 
to produce insensitivity towards personal and social needs. For example, Keating 
justifies competition in society on the grounds that it is a manifestly efficient 
way of selecting a candidate for a prestigious medical school. "What alternative 
to the competitive principle would those who denigrate it offer?" he asks. In 
view of the drastic shortage of doctors and medical schools to train them, an 
obvious, immediate and serious answer would be to decrease the competitive­
ness by increasing the availability of medical training. One might expect from an 
ethical consideration of competition some critical awareness of the consequences 
it may have. Instead, Keating responds to a charge that competitive games tend 
to bring out the worst in children with the irrelevant remark that its author 
shows himself to be abysmally ignorant of athletics. 
I should make clear that I am sympathetic to Professor Keating's stated aim 
•All future publication riehts reserved by the author. 
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of establishing a norm by which to regulate and limit the degree of competition 
in athletics. However, I am dis.5atisfied with_ his approach and his norm; his code 
of sportsmanship does not go nearly far enough. Furthermore, his philosophical 
stance is disturbing; it appears to be an accommodation to the status quo. I 
believe that we still need to work to change our world for the better; to move 
towards this goal, we need to reconsider our views of competition within a 
context broader than that provided by the sports world. Keating does acknowl­
edge that competition has played a dominant role in many aspects of American 
life, especially in economics. He fails to remark, however, that a salient feature in 
modern economic theory has involved serious reconsideration of the practical 
and moral validity of competition in national and international economies. The 
history of political legislation in twentieth century America involves lengthy 
chapters about regulation and restraint of competition. Recently, even leaders in 
the business world hav.e expressed doubts about competition, an� some are 
seeking alternatives to the competitive principle. Should not leaders· in the 
sports world also examine competition critically? Outside of the world of 
business, there has been a considerable amount of negative thinking about 
competition, especially in view of its consequences for personal and social well­
being. Keating's ethics of competition are jejune, because he fails to consider 
the nature of competition in the context of our society. Sports and athletics do 
not take place in a vacuum. They are permeateq by numerous social forces and 
interpreted in terms of dominant cultural norms. 
Rather than remain on the level of belief and morality, which tends to heat 
up quickly, I suggest moving to a cooler level of methodology. Before prose· 
cuting a contextual analysis, it would be well to expose a few underlying 
assumptions associated with competition. Keating makes a common American 
�umption about the naturalness, indeed inevitabiJity, of competition. Ameri­
cans tend to think that competing is "doing what comes naturally." A little 
social history is helpful to counte�act this unwarranted assumption. 2 During the 
past century we have so ingested Darwinistic notions about natural selection 
and survival of the fittest, that we have taken them to be indubitable facts; 
actually, they were theories meant to account for an order of reality different 
from modem human life. Americans have been acting out these biological 
theories in their economic and social lives so that we have seen them as human 
facts supporting our assumptions about competition. However congruent com­
petition is with our success-oriented life style, we cannot absolutize it as a uni­
versally dominant natural, social, and individual force. Biologists have even 
suggested that dynamics other than competition or aggression are more funda­
mental to life, such as the tendency towards stabilization and equilibrium.3 
From this perspective, competition may be unnatural. Social sciences have 
given ample testimony that competition is not a significai:it factor in many 
other societies. Jn fact, in most societies competitiveness is incompatible with 
traditional social structures. From a scientific perspective, there are good reasons 
for being critical of this common American assumption. 
There are also reasons for rejecting Lovejoy's definition of competition, which 
Keating accepts as normative after adding a qualifying phrase. The final version 
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reads: "Competition is an attempt, according to agreed-upon rules, to get or to 
keep any valuable thing, either to the exclusion of others or in greater measure 
than others." Both philosophers apparently see competition as an acquisitive 
stance; it is oriented towards obtaining some thing. As a contextual analysis 
will indicate, there are other stances within which competition can be viewed. 
The original meaning of the Latin verb competo itself suggests an activity quite 
different from that prescribed by the above definition. This verb refers to acting 
together or seeking together; hence, it implies the notion of coming together to 
reach an agreement. An additional notion, one of contest, infiltrated the term 
as it was applied to athletic encounters. The original meaning of the Latin term 
for contest is also significant for our purposes. The verb con tendo signifies to 
stretch, to strain or exert oneself. As implied in the Greek term agon, a contest 
is an encounter in which one stretches himself towards his physical and mental 
limits. A. contestant is one· who is engaged in an activity that calls forth the full 
exercise of his powers. By contending, he testifies to his aptitude and ability. 
Competition signifies an interpersonal contest in which participants testify to 
their competence as they interact. A quick etymological consideration is enough 
to indicate how different the classical frame of reference was from that proposed 
by Lovejoy and Keating. 
It is possible to move reflection beyond these alternatives by considering 
other contexts. We can construct ideal types of cultures and then consider the 
kind of fit competition will have within them. For numerous reasons, this 
presentation will have to move on a high level of abstractio'!l. However, these 
ideal types are not meant to be hypothetical; they have been constructed with 
specific social and cultural contexts in mind.4 While some aspects of this anal­
ysis will be similar to the work of other students of sport, there will be 
noticeable differences. I shall not, for example, attempt to assess to what extent 
competitive sports fit in with the American social system;5 nor shall I suggest 
some moral ideal which might be sought to guide and correct athletic behavior 
today. The method employed here is basically a cross-cultural comparison of 
types of societies in terms of their orientations towards dominant values. Un· 
like most monographs in this vein, however, the purpose of my article is not to 
present the findings of a study. Hopefully, this contextual approach will sti:qm· 
late some empirical studies so that we can have a more comprehensive and 
realistic framework within which to understand, interpret, and assess competi· 
tion not only in sports, but in all aspects of human life. 
I propose that we consider four cultural constellations to be characterized 
by their conceptions of normative activity. These four types can be denoted as: 
Being, Becoming, Doing, and Having. There are other types of cultures which 
could be classified in terms of different dominant behavior patterns. For 
example, one can think of a Destroying type of culture, where the institu­
tionalized life style i§ essentially predatory and dest.ructive; but instances of 
such cultures are rare and not useful to this analysis. One can imagine other 
types oriented around _different types of activity. There could be a Winning 
culture composed of rhultiple Vince Lombardis; there could even be Loving 
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cultures. However, these ideas are merely hypothetical and do not serve the 
purpose of this contextual approach. Each type of cultural constellation will 
be examined in terms of constants which serve to indicate some distinctive 
variations between them. The constants to be considered here are: views of 
time, space, normative activity, interpersonal and social relations, and life goals 
or aspired final states. Other constants would have to be considered to obtain 
a fuller understanding of the types themselves; however, these five will be 
sufficient for our immediate purposes. 
The term being is here meant to denote a dominant value orientation that 
may be found in numerous societies throughout history, including both primi­
tive and highly traditional ones. In the modem world, some Eastern societies and 
some subcultures in Western societies, such as our own Spanish-American and 
Indian groups, would fall into this category. Within this cultural constellation, 
time is perceived as either unimportant because it is segregated from eternity, 
or meaningful in terms of the past. Within the latter view, the "great time" was 
believed to have been long ago, not now, or yet to come.7 Today's time is 
valuable insofar as it reco vers, recapitulates, or extends the power and meaning 
of "that" time. Those who lived long ago are not merely ancestors; they are con· 
ceived as heroes or gods. Their time was a golden or sacred era; in cohtrast, the 
present is perceived as a degenerate or at least a vapid era. The view of space is 
correlative to that of time; it similarly lacks a dynamic perspective. As man in 
time is seen to be heavily dependent upon the past, so he is conceiv.ed to be 
subordinate to nature. The forces of nature are seen to dominat� the lived 
space of this world; consequently, the proper role for man is submission to 
them. In this perspective., man exists under nature. The people of a being cul­
ture tend to be fatalistic. Man is dominated by forces of the pa$t and by his 
environment. There is no reaso.n to attempt to change one's situation. Whatever 
will be, will be. Quite logically, the view of normative activity is characterized in 
terms of being. There is a receptive acceptance of things as they are, along with 
the view that man should not interfere with the present orde:r. A motto for this 
life style might well read: "Let it be!" In social life, there. is great emphasis 
placed upon lineal relationships, as seen in highly traditionalistic behavior that 
attempts to preserve the memory and the manners of the group line. Their reli­
gions also contain a ritualistic orientation towards the past and a strong emphasis 
upon yielding to dominant life forces and obedience to old customs. True piety 
means submission. In personal life, emphasis is placed upon finding peaceful 
accommodation with the cosmos. Consequently, there is little awareness of the 
self as an independent uniit. Rather, the self is conceived as an expr�ssion of the 
group or an extension of some primal source. Conflict must be avoided so as to 
preserve continuity with one's family, the group, one's environment, and the 
universe. A major aspiration for self and reality is continuity, or even an unin­
terrupted flow of being. 
It should be obvious that within this type of yalue orientation competition 
simply does not have a logical place. When we find evidence of competition. it 
may be regarded as a d�viant form of activity; or, it could signify a souroo of 
tension and con.fusion. SUJch has been the case when baseball, for example, has 
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been institutionalized in a being type of culture. In some co mmunities in the 
American Southwest these games have been experienced as a threat to the 
entire fabric of the traditional culture. In other instances, games from other 
cultures have been refashioned so that the competitiveness in them is greatly 
reduced. Within a being perspective, however, anyone who defines competition 
as a rightful attempt to get or keep any valuable thing to the exclusion of others 
in his community would be suitably dispatched and dispensed with. In the more 
mystical versions of this cultural type, anyone espousing this view of competition 
would be told that his way of seeking is ill-conceived. As T. S. Eliot put it: 
"In order to possess what you do not possess 
You must go by the way of dispossession." 
The religious language of being cultures is not in terms of grasping but of sacri­
fice. One is told to give up in order to receive, to lose in order to attain. Com­
petition and value simply do not inhabit the same realm in the universe when 
viewed from this perspective. 
A becoming culture evinces a different set of attitudes towards those con"'. 
stants we just examined in a being constellation. With regard to time, the present 
is seen to have the greatest reality. The vitality and significance of the past is seen 
to fade quickly away, while the future looms uncertainly on the horizon . Now is 
the moment about which to be concerned. Why put off until tomorrow what 
you can enjoy today? The view of space is correlative with the more optimistic 
temporality. Space provides an area for development of natural and human 
potentiality. Necessity and the forces of nature are respected!; but in addition, 
there is an awareness of possibility and opportunity. Man's proper relationship 
to nature is conceived in terms of cooperation rather than stl!bjugation. Within , 
this perspective, man lives with nature . Both time and space are more ambiguous 
than in a being perspective, for they open up to man, providing chances for 
achievement as well as failure. The cosmos allows for freedom and presents man 
with challenges for its expression. Normative human activity is here conceived as 
becoming. In Aristotle's grand conception of this perspective, all of reality is 
moved by the dynamics of actualization of potentialities. Man is the highest and 
most complete expression of this fundamental principle. His personal life is to be 
measured in terms of self-development. Social life is also conceived in terms of 
becoming. Like individuals, cities have goals as well as virtues and vices. In �oth 
interpersonal and social dimensions, there is more concern for collateral relation­
sftips than lineal ones. Friendship becomes a virtue challenging filial devotion, 
and justice is seen to be the aim of social process. Cooperation is emphasized 
rather than submission and obedience. The goal of life is conceived as the fullest 
realization of human and natural powers. Individuals and cities should strive for 
the achievement of excellence. 
Competition has definitely found a place within becoming cultures, though 
it has at the same time been recognized as productive of tension; and some­
times it has been seen to lead to disaster. Consequently, there has often been an 
emphasis upon limits within which competition must be kept. For example, the 
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well-known Delphic oracle commonly rendered "to know thyself" actually 
meant that one should know his limits and respect them. Within the becoming 
perspective of classical Athens, the worst sin was hubris, the arrogance of un­
restrained anger .that can so easily emerge in competitive situations. To trans­
gress natural and moral limitations is the essence of hubris. Religion, philosophy, 
drama, the arts, rhetoric, and the laws collaborated in the classical tradition to 
keep competition within the framework of moderation and cooperation. There 
are examples of competition as defined by Keating to be found in classical cul­
ture, but they were held to be contemptible rather than normative. Plato went so 
far as to recommend child's play rather than agonistic activity as the way to lead 
a good life. Cicero scorned competitive athletic contests as beneath contempt. 
Even great military leade·rs singled out cooperation rather than competition as 
the most natural form of interaction. Marcus Aurelius, for example, wrote: 
For we are made for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like 
the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another, then, 
is contrary to nature.8 
All of these representative men were competitive in some aspects of their lives. 
However, they apparently saw competition as a form of becoming. It was a mode 
of self-actualization and self-expression rather than one of acquisition. Insofar 
as competition is consonant with a becoming value orientation, it is viewed as 
an activity with another rather than as against him. The aim of competitive 
activity here is to interact so that participants actualize their fullest poten­
tialities; it is not meant to deprive someone else of something valuable. 
A third cultural constellation is oriented around the activity of doing. This 
type of culture is very activistic, practical, and productive. The United States, 
especially during its formative years, might be considered a paradigm of this 
type. Time in a doing culture is future oriented. While the present is important, 
its significance is seen in terms of its leading to greater opportunities. Americans 
have typically been future oriented and have viewed time as a ribbon stretching 
ahead to a brighter tomo�ow. In a being culture, change is viewed as a threat; in 
a _doing cult�re, the lack of change is threatening. For members of the latter 
cultural type, "time marches on" towards greater progress. The space of a doing 
culture is also seen. in a distinctive way. Space is viewed impersonally as an area 
within which one might put his time to good use. Nature is neither an oppressive 
force nor a realm calling for a harmonious relationship. On the contrary, nature 
represents raw material that man should control for his own purposes. In this 
perspective, man is seen to be over nature. The proper stance towards space is 
one of mastery. In classical culture, natural limits were emphasized; in America 
.one is told, "the sky's the limit." Athenians were aware of their limits and 
afraid to go too far; Americans have not known what their limits are and have 
been afraid of not reaching them. The normative activity within this type of 
orientation is neither being nor becoming but doing. Just being is viewed 
negatively; it is laziness as opposed to virtuous productivity. Congruent with 
time-space notions, truly valuable doing is thought of as getting results. In other 
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cultures, work was viewed as a curse; in this perspective, it is sl!en as man's 
highest calling. Hard work is inherently valuable7 but even more so when it is 
productive and useful. This type of culture is production oriented and utilitarian. 
Its heroes are great pr9ducers. The view of self in this perspective is character­
istically indi.vidualistic. Doing your own work is more important than preserving 
social and interpersonal relationships. Manners, customs, and even pers-0nal 
sensitivities can legitimately be ignored or suppressed if they stand in the way of 
getting the job done. Good human relationships are justified not so much as ends 
but as factors contributing to more efficient operation. Friendly relations are 
helpful to business. The final objective of this type of life style is success. A 
primary fear is of failing to "make it." 
Competition has played a significant role in the evolution of doing cultures, 
especially in the United States. The struggle to achieve success has often been 
supported by the rhetoric of competition as a valuable form of activity. The 
world is seen as a great arena; wherever one finds himself, he should strive to win. 
Within this context, the meaning of competition undergoes a transformation. In 
a becoming orientation, one normally competes with another to develop human 
potential and to make it manifest. Competition is thus an intrinsic part of the 
actualization of self and the other person. It is governed by those goals. In a 
doing orientation, one competes to accomplish results which may be extrinsic to 
the actual competitive process. The aim of competition in this context is 
logically to excell; but the boundaries of competition here become confused by 
extraneous goals. Competitiveness then may be encouraged in the most unlikely 
areas, such as learning, working, and attracting friends. It is possible t_hat all 
meaningful doing is eventu�ly interpreted in competitive terms. Thus, com­
petition is conceived as an interminable historical process. Heroes are those who 
compete constantly. A doer valu� those people who refuse to quit, who never 
say die, and who win. 
The fourth constellation is clustered around the activity of having. While 
this type of orientation may be found among people who have undergone 
serious deprivation and are thus anxiously motivated to obtain and keep what­
ever they can, it is also disc�mable among people in highly successful, affluent 
societies. For example, this kind of life stance may be found in modern 
industrial states in which the orientation has shifted from production to con­
sumption. The primary value �rientation is in terms of what persons have, rather 
than what they do. In a doing culture, a man's work defines his status; in a 
·having culture, a person's status is established more in terms of what he can 
demonstrate he has through manifest consumption. Within a having constella­
tion, time is, still future oriented, but the focus is upon an immediate future, 
and the tempo has increased. A producer will look to the far distant future and 
wait patiently for his work to come to fruition. A consumer is impatient to 
have his needs gratified. The temporality of a haver is characterized by a demand 
for immediate gratification. As a mem�r of the instant generation, he is con­
stantly on the alert for smortcuts to satisfaction. The spatiality of this orien­
tation signifies a transformation of a doing perspective. Here man is also con­
ceived as · being over nature. In this instance, however, nature is not merely to 
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be tamed; it is to be "had." A having stance not only dominates a given space, 
but utterly transforms it. Material eventually is seen as so much potential 
waste products. A haver's attitude towards space is similar to the "disposal 
mentality" of the throw-away society portrayed by Toffler.9 Within a having 
orientation, space is conceived possessively; one is uneasy until he can own it, 
that is, get his hands on it. Normative human activity is thought to be acquisi­
tive. Verbs such as gel, hold, keep, hang on to, and have resonate the primary 
value orientation of this type of culture. The mode of social and interpersonal 
relationships in this orientation continues to be individualistic, but here, too, a 
shift is noticeable from a doing perspective. The measure of significant individual 
activity becomes less public and more internalized into a private standard of 
satisfaction. Valuable activity is assessed in terms of how one feels about what 
he has rather than how others judge the results of his efforts. There is a marked 
increase in infantile self-centeredness and relativism. It's good if you like it. 
Living well is interpreted in terms of feeling good. As the individual becomes 
privatized, there is a corresponding growth of bureaucracy to take care of many 
responsibilities that doers used to a�ume. The final state desired within this 
perspective is a perpetual state of private, individual contentment. 
Within a having orientation, competition has no inherent position. If it exists 
here, it will be extrinsically related to normative activity. That is, competition 
will be valued if it is seen as an efficient way to increase having, but it can as 
easily be dropped if other ways of attaining what is desired are believed to be 
superior. So, for example, vigorous exponents of free enterprise can quickly 
alter their view and support restrictive tariffs, which eliminate competition 
that threatens their profits. Within a having orientation, one competes against 
another in order to have something valuable in greater measure than he has. 
Corresponding to the aspiration towards contentment, there may be an attempt 
to regulate competition through technology and an increase in rules so as to 
keep tension and risk to a minimum. Allhough excitement will thereby be 
reduced, these procedures are justified in terms of the primary concerns about 
having a prize and a satisfied feeling at the end. The interest in competition in 
athletics here shifts from doing something to gaining satisfaction by watching 
others do it. Thus competition is perceived more as a satisfying form of enter­
tainment, something to give thri11s and pleasure to millions of spectators. A code 
of competition emerges that emphasizes the need for competitors to observe 
rules so as not to spoil a good show. Within this orientation, competitive 
activities, like everything else, become extremely vulnerable to commercial­
ization. When the value of an activity is measured by what you can take away 
from it, its inherent worth is suppressed in favor of utilizing the activity to 
obtain money by satisfying customers. Even the competitor sees his activity as 
oriented towards more having, for wealth is the primary means towards greater 
consumption. Competitors and the competitive activity become commodities 
to be consumed within a life style that is oriented towards having more and 
more. 
This typology of cultural contexts is useful in several ways. First, it suggests 
the cultural bias that has influenced Keating's definition and his philosophy. 
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His conceptualization fits best in a context that is in a transitional stage between 
doing and having orientations. While he emphasizes that his philosophy is 
descriptive and functional, it should be recognized that it is so only within his 
specific context. There is no -:eason to accord it universality. His insistence that 
competition requires seeking to excell or surpass is essentially a prescriptive 
statement; it may be considered descriptive within a doing context. His notion 
that competition is an attempt to get or keep something to the exclusion of 
others best fits a having orientation. Such a view is appropriate for an acquisitive 
society but not other types. His rigid distinctions between athletics and play are 
further indications of his value orientation. Unless one chooses to absolutize 
Keating's goals, it is unnecessary to insist upon these distinctions. For example, 
one can indeed compete to beat somebody and obtain a prize. But within 
.another ori.entation, the goal might be personal and social development. If that 
seems incredible, then one is simply not stepping outside the context o f  his 
cultural bias. To make a workable definition of a significant human activity, it 
is important to consider the full socio-cultural context within which it occurs 
rather than just an immediate manifest goal. The advantage of this typology of 
contexts is that it provides a broad, flexible framework within which to under­
stand and assess the meaning of competition in a given situation. 
Another advantage of this approach is that it provides an incentive for 
reassessing our understanding of other relevant activities, such as play. Keating's 
conceptualization of play patently exhibits a doing-having orientation. From 
that perspective, the play phenomenon is simply delightful; the essence of play 
is pleasure. That is a traditional interpretation of play from within the perspec­
tive of a Western work ethic. By reducing play to pleasure, the worker robs it of 
serious significance. However. careful study of play in various contexts has 
revealed that it is a much more complex and important activity than workers and 
athletes might suspect.10 In addition to being fun, play can constitute a very im­
portant form of learning. In a child's world, for example, where there is a domi­
nant orientation towards growth, play represents a significant form of testing 
and discovery. ln therapy and numerous ordinary situations, play can be a mode 
of attaining important personal and interpersonal insight. Within an esthetic 
context play can be a primary mode of developing creativity and enhancing 
productivity. In various situations, especially those associated with a becoming 
orientation, play can be a vital mode of self �xpression in which one displays 
his true self. A serious question which needs to be faced is whether or not 
authentic play can tolerate competition. The inclination of many play theorists 
thus far seems to indicate a negative answer. 
However, a positive assessment of competition with a play orientation has 
recently been provided by Scott Kretchmar.1 1  From within a phenomenological 
perspective that manifests strong inclinations towards a becoming orientation, 
Kretchmar sees play as emerging from existential fullness. While his view of 
work is suspiciously negative, he has a point. Within his view work proceeds from 
an encounter with necessity. You work because you have to; yo'u do not need to 
play. Thus characterized, play is seen to have its own time; its ternpora1ity is 
constituted by a full present. The space of play is open, providing players with a 
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sense of adventure and challenge. It is an activity that is expressive of the self. It 
views relationships to others in terms of opposition. At this point in his argu­
ment, Kretchmar makes some very important distinctions relevant to the above 
question. One's opponent is not neces.5arily viewed as a threat to one's own 
attempts to acquire something valuable. On the contrary, an opponent primarily 
provides the challenge necessary to express oneself and to develop one's capa­
cities to the fullest. Consequently, competitive play can be recognized as con­
stituting an interdependence between opponents whose contest mutually testi­
fies to their personal worth. From this perspective, a true sportsman is not a 
hard worker who is legalistically concerned about his attainment but a good 
player who cares about our experience of our game. If one views competition 
and play consistently within the same value orientation of becoming, t!hen 
apparently both modes of activity may converge to form an intrinsic element of 
self and social development. 
One general lesson to be learned from this approach is that words and deeds 
have different meanings according to the cultural contexts within which they 
occur. Only if we insist upon the superiority or necessity of one context over all 
the others should we become dogmatic in our interpretations of human action. 
Consequently, competition and sports, work and play will take on different 
meanings within diverse cultural contexts. Competition in a doing or having 
culture will perform a different function from that within a becoming culture. 
Similarly, competition in a warlike perspective will be directed towards sur­
passing another and acqlliring valuable things exclusively. An opponent is thus 
viewed as an obstacle to be overcome. From within a self-actualization perspec­
tive, comp�tition might be viewed as a form of encounter that occurs for mutual 
benefit. These are not the only alternatives, however. Another goal towards 
which competition might be oriented is the formation of friendships and com­
munity. Within a sharing orientation, people might compete in order to evoke a 
world of play in which bonds of reciprocity are established. In this context, one 
could compete with another not merely to do his best but to create a playful 
situation in which to interact freely, totally, and honestly with other persons. In 
most perspectives, it is difficult for opponents to be good friends; but in a shar­
ing orientation, it would be possible for competitors to become the best of 
friends, because they would compete with, rather than against, each other. 
The purpose of this article has been to suggest a contextual approach with 
which to understand and assess important forms of human action, such as 
competition, sports, and play. I have suggested that definitions and philosophies 
should be worked out not only in view of their own context but of alternatives. 
Furthermore, it has become apparent that different types of competition may be 
delineated by considering the framework of various ideal types of dominant 
value orientations within which competitive behavior takes place. 
In view of the increasing aggravation of problems in the modern world, there 
is also a need for substantial moral considerations. Towards that end, types of 
value orientation other than those already delineated may be necessary. At least 
a fifth type of culture should be considered as a viable alternative towards which 
to work and play. This type can be denoted as a sharing culture in which the 
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dominant form of care is for the well being of the total context; as such, its care 
would be inclusive of the other types. If competition is to survive in this kind of 
culture, then I propose that it be understood in the following way within the 
specific context of sports. Here competition would be a form of social and/or 
interpersonal encounter in which participants interact in a contest wherein the 
goals are to test abilities, increase in competence, express freedom, and share in 
a common endeavor to cr·eate a more playful environment in which bonds of 
friendship and community are strengthened. Admittedly, this is an idealistic 
notion. But unless one opts for a materialistic view of history, he must recognize 
the importance of ideals as formative social forces influencing the shape of 
human destiny. It is just possible that if the institution of sports were reoriented 
towards a sharing value constellation, it might function to counter the trend 
towards greater having and foster the development of a more humane world. At 
least that is something for an ethics of competition and sports to take into 
consideration. 
FOOTNOTES 
lThroughout this article I am referring to only one article by James W. Keating: "A 
Philosophy of Competition and the Nature of Athletics." Printed in the journal Philosophic 
Exchange, Summer, 1973. A more explicit expression of my belief about the nature of 
competition in contemporary American society may be found in: "Competition Out of 
Bounds: Sports in American Life." To be published in Quest and originally given in 
�ifferent form as an address at the AAHPBR Convention in Houston, March, 1972. 
See especially the illuminating study by Richard Hofstadter. Social Darwinism in American 
Ihought, rev. ed. New York: George Braziller, Inc. 1959. Consider, for example, works by two prominent biologists. Theodosius Dobzhansky. 'l'he 
Biological Basis of Human Freedom, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. Rene 
Dubos. So Human An Animal. New York: Scribner's, 1968 and his more recent A God With· 
:J!· New York: Scribner's, 1972. 
Jn formulating this approach I have been greatly influenced b y  Clyde Kluckhohn and 
Talcott Parsons' works, which have stressed the Importance of values in the understanding uf 
social systems. cf. T. Parsons and E. A. �hils, eds. Toward a General Theory of Action, New 
York: Harper .and Row, 1961. I have adapted much of the value orientation framework pro· 
vided by Florence Kluckhohn and Fl'ed Strodtbeck. Variations in Value Orientations. 
Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co. 1961. Also influential is the work of Edmund Hall, whose 
concept of culture provides numerous constants which can be significant in cross cultural 
gomparisons. cf. his The Silent Language. Garden City: Doubleday & Co. 1959. 
cf. Gerald S. Kenyon. "Sport and Society: At Odds or in Concert'!" unpublished 
article. 
6cf. Earle F. Zeigler. "Putting. the Greek Ideal in Perspective in North American Athletics 
roday .'' un'Published article. 
Mircea Eliade has provided a useful ideal portrait of a religious culture that approximates 
the concept being developed here. cf. his The Sacred and the Profane. New York: Harper 
�nd Row, 1961. 
Marcus Aurelius. Meditations. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967. Bk. II. 9 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock. New York: Random H<>use, 1970. 101 have previously attempted to set forth some import.ant elements of play elsewhere. cf. 
William A. Sadler. Jr. "Creative Existence: Play as a Pathway to Personal Freedom and 
tfmmunity.'' Humanitas V/1. 1969. 
Scott Kretchmar. "Ontological Possibilities: Sport as Play.'' Philosophic Exchange. 
Summer, 1972. 
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